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Richard Boyd (1988, 1991, 1999) has long campaigned for a view of natural kinds he calls the 
Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account. This account has been particularly exciting for 
philosophers of biology unhappy with traditional essentialism about natural kinds and the views 
that biological kinds are, in one way or another, “historical entities”. Though defenders of HPC 
kinds have done much to further articulate the view (see, for example, Kornblith 1993; Griffiths 
1997, 1999; Wilson 1999, 2005; Wilson et al. 2007; Chakravartty 2007), many questions about 
the account remain. One pressing question concerns the way in which HPC kinds are supposed to 
accommodate our inductive and explanatory practices via causal, homeostatic mechanisms.
 In addressing the question, I am led to an alternative conception of what a property cluster 
kind might be. I call my alternative, in deference to its Boydian origins, the Stable Property 
Cluster (SPC) account of natural kinds. Rather than emphasizing homeostasis or causal mecha-
nism, the SPC account emphasizes the stability of a property cluster over the various ways stabil-
ity may be maintained. In virtue of this modest change of emphasis, the SPC account does not 
advertise itself as an account of a kind of natural kind — it is, I think, an attractive candidate for 
a general natural kind concept, able to accommodate the diversity of natural kinds we find in the 
world.
 I begin by motivating the cluster approach to natural kinds: how it fell initially to the neo-
essentialism of Kripke and Putnam but was later reinvigorated by Boyd (§2). Because previous 
discussion of neo-essentialism tended to focus on the exciting semantic and metaphysical theses 
Kripke and Putnam proposed — some thought it a resurrection of Aristotelian essentialism — the 
affinity between essentialist kinds and HPC kinds is sometimes under-emphasized. There is, I 
suggest, a deep pragmatic affinity between these two accounts which the SPC account helps il-
luminate (§3). After outlining a few methodological and metaphysical worries for the HPC ac-
count’s invocation of causal mechanisms (§4), I outline a conception of stability for property 
cluster kinds and explore the sense in which it underpins the reality of kind distinctions (§§5–6). 
The final section (§7) considers species as a case study for the SPC account, illustrating a way in 
which the independently-motivated features of the SPC account do better than the HPC account 
at addressing worries about treating species as natural kinds.
2. The Fall and Rise of Cluster Concepts
Recall that cluster accounts of reference were seen as an improvement on what Putnam called the 
“traditional view” according to which the meaning of kind terms is given by a conjunction of 
properties (Putnam 1975, 140). On the cluster view, rather than possessing a set of necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions, names were associated with a cluster of descriptions none of which 
were necessary — so long as a thing featured “enough” of the properties so clustered. The whole 
loose cluster is, in a sense, the essence of the kind. What Kripke argued so convincingly about 
the case of proper names (like ‘Aristotle’ or ‘Moses’) is that even this loose cluster of properties 
is often obviously neither necessary nor sufficient. This strongly suggested that the same diffi-
culty would beset natural kind terms.
 This intuition, however, depends on accepting that there are natural kind essences to be dis-
covered — and there are good reasons for thinking that the discovery account of kind essence is 
in some trouble. In any case, one can clearly accept the direct reference theory for some types of 
names (those of people, say) and yet deny that it plausibly applies to natural kinds. While this is 
clearly a logical possibility, what positive reason can we offer for accepting the cluster view in 
even this narrow realm of cases?
 Let’s remember the motivation behind extending the direct reference account to kind terms 
and positing essences in the first place. As Putnam notes, natural kind terms have a special place 
in science: they designate “classes of things that we regard as of explanatory importance: classes 
whose normal distinguishing characteristics are ‘held together’ or even explained by deep-lying 
mechanisms. Gold, lemon, tiger, acid, are examples of such nouns” (1975, 139). This “holding 
together” helps explain several features of natural kind terms: First, that members of a natural 
kind have associated properties more or less in common. We would never have been tempted to a 
cluster approach if it had not seemed that natural kinds had more than one property in common. 
Second, that they might find a role in inductions and explanations: my observation that several 
objects possess a series of properties in common might suggest to me that I may really be ob-
serving effects of a common cause. Perhaps a subset of those effects might reliably indicate the 
presence of the cause and thus of a larger set of effects. Chakravartty offers a compelling meta-
phor:
Properties, or property instances, are not the sorts of things that come randomly 
distributed across space-time. They are systematically “sociable” in various ways. 
They “like” each other’s company. The highest degree of sociability is evidenced 
by essence kinds, where specific sets of properties are always found together. In 
other cases, lesser degrees of sociability are evidenced by the somewhat looser 
associations that make up cluster kinds. In either case, it is the fact that members 
of kinds share properties, to whatever degree, that underwrites the inductive gen-
eralizations and predictions to which these categories lend themselves. (Chakra-
vartty 2007, 170)
Once we appreciate the importance of the “clustering” of properties, we naturally ask after its 
explanation. Essences neatly fulfill this role: the “sociability” of a kind’s properties is explained 
by their being jointly instantiated by the possessor of the kind. Indeed, this may a good reason 
for counting a certain property as a kind essence in the first place. 
 The essentialist explanation of clustering is so good — and apparently so prevalent — that it 
is tempting to suppose that it is the only possible explanation. Devitt expressed this attitude in his 
argument for intrinsic biological essentialism. The law-like truth of generalizations about bio-
logical taxa (such as ‘Indian rhinos have two horns’) demands explanation: “There has to be 
something about the very nature of the group . . . that, given its environment, determines the truth 
of the generalization. That something is an intrinsic underlying, probably largely genetic, prop-
erty that is part of the essence of the group. Indeed, what else could it be?” (2008, 352). But why 
suppose that there is any one explanation for property clustering, much less that it is the exis-
tence of essential properties attaching to the kind?
 The insight of Richard Boyd’s version of the cluster account is precisely that individual es-
sences are not always needed as the glue holding together a cluster of properties — a cluster of 
properties “can hold itself” together. He writes:
I argue that there are a number of scientifically important kinds (properties, rela-
tions, etc.) whose natural definitions are very much like the property-cluster defi-
nitions postulated by ordinary-language philosophers except that the unity of the 
properties in the defining cluster is mainly causal rather than conceptual. (Boyd 
1991, 141)
Kornblith puts the central claim this way: “Natural kinds involve causally stable combinations of 
properties residing together in an intimate relationship” (1993, 7). The “intimacy” or “sociabil-
ity” of these clusters is maintained by what Boyd calls “homeostatic mechanisms” — sometimes 
instantiated by a subset of the properties themselves. 
 Not surprisingly, there is a certain temptation to treat “HPC Kinds” as subclass of the natural 
kinds — perhaps one of a number of distinct kinds of natural kinds. Boyd’s presentation encour-
ages this thought, as he describes himself as identifying “a class of natural kinds, properties and 
relations whose definitions are provided not by any set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but 
instead by a ‘homeostatically’ sustained clustering of those properties or relations” (1999, 141; 
my emphasis). Wilson, Barker, and Brigandt take the cue; in their discussion of stem cells, they 
list a number of characteristics typically possessed by stem cells, noting that “there are excep-
tions, so that the above describes a genuine HPC kind” (2007, 218). This makes it sound as if 
rather than HPC kinds tolerating the non-instantiation of some of a cluster’s properties in a 
member of the kind it characterizes, such lapses were in fact required for that kind to be one of 
the scruffy yet hip HPC underground. Even their title, “When Traditional Essentialism Fails”, 
suggests that HPC is a sort of liberal fallback account of natural kinds — reserved for when 
things get too roudy for the tidy, conservative essentialist kinds to manage. That HPC and tradi-
tional essentialist kinds are meant to occupy disjoint territory should also be clear by reflecting 
on the oddity of thinking of microstructural essences as causal homeostatic mechanisms main-
taining the stability of a cluster of properties.
 Adopting this sort of compartmentalized stance about HPC kinds has its strategic advantages. 
For one, it allows essentialists and defenders of other accounts to reign more or less unchal-
lenged in their separate fiefdoms. If a particular example of a purported natural kind fits poorly 
in the HPC mold, an HPCer needn’t press the matter. She can shrug and admit that the purported 
kind may not be an HPC kind while maintaining that some kinds are. While there is nothing in-
appropriate about this maneuver, I think that we can do better. I am not alone. Alexander Bird 
also suggested that the HPC account
can be extended to all natural kinds. The laws will explain why there are certain 
clusters; they will also explain the natures of those clusters — the loose and vague 
clusters in biology, the partially precise clusters of chemistry and the perfectly 
precise clusters of particle physics. Boyd introduces his idea in order to provide 
an alternative to the essentialist view of natural kinds. However, if I am right, the 
homeostatic property cluster approach can be expanded to include the essentialist 
view in respect of the kinds to which it applies. (2007, 210–211)
With minimal revision, HPCers can aspire to limn the contours of a more general account of 
natural kinds on which essentialist kinds are a limiting case. 
 We can get there by asking: What makes HPC kinds a particular kind of natural kind? Why 
are they not a different phenomenon altogether? The answer lies in the characteristic function of 
natural kinds within scientific investigation, a subject on which Boyd and Putnam apparently 
agree and to which we now turn.
3. Accommodating our Inductive Strategies
Boyd’s account apparently allows us to accord a theory-neutral reading of the metaphor of 
worldly “joints”. He writes:
Kinds useful for induction or explanation must always “cut the world at its joints” 
in this sense: successful induction and explanation always require that we ac-
commodate our categories to the causal structure of the world. Of course the em-
piricist has a Humean conception of the reference to causal structure whereas the 
realist has a metaphysical one. (Boyd 1991, 139)
We uncover privileged taxonomic divisions, on this conception, by discovering which property-
clusters are causally sustained. Boyd thus allies himself with Quine on the role of natural kinds 
in science: “the theory of natural kinds is about how schemes of classification contribute to the 
formulation and identification of projectible hypotheses” (Boyd 1999, 147). This “accommoda-
tion thesis” is at the heart of Boyd’s HPC account. In this sense, the homeostatic mechanisms 
maintaining the sociability of a cluster of properties in HPC kinds are playing the same role in 
accommodating our inferential and explanatory practices as did Putnam’s essences.
 Moreover, both Boyd and Putnam clearly have the sense that something — be it an essence, a 
homeostatic mechanism, or some other feature of “the causal structure of the world” — must un-
derlie or explain the sociability of the property cluster. There is convergence in this matter with 
some recent thought about the problem of induction. In his discussion of “explanationist” strate-
gies for understanding inductive inference (pioneered by Harman 1965), Roger White notes an 
important difference between explaining our observations and explaining the truth of the gener-
alization itself:
The basic idea is that our support for the generalization that all Fs are G depends 
on how well it can explain our data, when we have observed many G Fs and no 
non-G Fs. But here we need to note a typically overlooked but crucial ambiguity. 
There are at least two explanatory tasks we might have in mind here:
E1: explaining, concerning the Fs we have observed, why they are G
E2: explaining why all observed Fs are G. (White 2005, 7)
Take E1: suppose we have only observed one F and found that it is G. The generalization that all 
Fs are Gs does not appear to explain why this one F (say, a blade of grass) is G(reen) — that is 
explained by the presence of chlorophyll (Peacocke 2004, 139). On the other hand, says White, 
E2 “is a claim about us, namely that we haven’t set eyes on a non-G F. In E1 we are explaining 
instances of the generalization that all Fs are G; in E2 we are explaining the absence of observa-
tions of counter-instances” (2005, 8).
 Peacocke calls E1 the “narrow-scope” and E2 the “wide-scope” reading of these explana-
tions: for in E1, the explanation does not involve our observations — we merely describe certain 
Fs on that basis, seeking explanations for their qualities (2004, 140). Pretty clearly, if either read-
ing is going to be relevant to induction, it will be the latter:
Under the wide-scope reading it seems to me correct to say that when the enu-
merative induction is sound the evidence—namely, that all observed Fs are Gs—
is really explained by the fact that all Fs are G. Here we are explaining a partially 
psychological condition—that the Fs that are observed are really G—by the hold-
ing of a condition that (in at least this respect) is not psychological, that all Fs are 
G. (ibid.)
But to many, including Peacocke, it seems that the mere fact that all Fs are G isn’t always quite 
enough to explain our observation to this effect — not, at least, in all circumstances. Its being a 
mere accident, for example, that all Fs are G robs that generalization of much explanatory poten-
tial:
Suppose one hundred spinnings of a roulette wheel are spinnings in which the ball 
lands on red, and suppose we observed the first fifty spinnings. The fact that all of 
the hundred spinnings ended with the ball landing on red is sufficient to explain 
why all the fifty observations of spinnings are ones in which the ball landed on 
red. But an inductive inference to the fifty-first spinning that it will end with the 
ball landing on red is unsound. The generalization does give the explanation of 
our evidence, but we are not entitled to the inductive inference if we know the 
wheel to be unbiased. (ibid.)
What is required, argues Peacocke, is a commitment to the existence of “some condition C that 
explains why all the Fs are G” (141). Ruth Millikan writes along similar lines that “Clearly a 
concept having [rich inductive potential] does not emerge by ontological accident. If a term is to 
have genuine [inductive potential], it had better attach not just to an accidental pattern of corre-
lated properties, but to properties correlated for a good reason” (2000, 17). 
 The advantage of the HPC account is that it offers a way of understanding the “non-
accidentality” of property clustering without having to invoke microstructural essences. This 
flexibility allows HPC kinds to accommodate our inferential and explanatory practices in do-
mains (such as biology) that have proved challenging to the essentialist. In the next section, I 
shall offer a few reasons for thinking that we can and should increase this flexibility further.
4. Concerns about Causal Mechanism
There are, it seems to me, four related (though distinct) reasons for moving away from the causal 
homeostatic mechanisms favored by the HPC account to a more general notion of stability for 
SPC account of natural kinds. The first is methodological: articulating a conception of natural 
kinds without making controversial metaphysical commitments about the nature of causal 
mechanism, homeostasis, and the causal structure of the world in general has certain advantages 
(cf. Strevens 2008, 7). The second is a concern about the ability of the notion of a causal homeo-
static mechanism to sufficiently accommodate our epistemic practices. A third, related reason is 
that the conception of causal homeostasis to which the HPC account has appealed remains 
somewhat vaguely defined. Sometimes it appears to be used in a literal sense; at others, it seems 
a mere metaphor. A fourth reason is that for many ways of precisely articulating the notion of a 
causal homeostatic mechanism, it seems doubtful that some purported kinds can be aptly handled 
by this account. This is not just the case for fundamental kinds (such as quarks and electrons), as 
I intimated above, but even for categories in the HPC’s stronghold of biology. 
 I shall describe these concerns below. In each case, committed HPCers might dig in their 
heels in various ways or offer further specifications that evade the difficulties. That is to be ex-
pected. And it is welcome; for I am no enemy of the HPC account and am prepared to be 
swayed. Still, the worries give me enough pause to want to articulate an alternative. That alterna-
tive is to relinquish causal language in favor of the idiom of stability. Homeostatic causal 
mechanisms are but one way to achieve the stability a bunch of clustered properties. 
4.1. Methodological Metaphysical Neutrality
If we philosophers agreed on how to understand causation, causal mechanism, and such notions, 
Boyd’s suggestion that we should accommodate our inferential and explanatory practices to “the 
causal structure of the world” might be more appealing. As things stand, however, consensus 
about the metaphysics of causation seems rather distant. Indeed, it is not even clear in what gen-
eral terms we should analyze causation. Shall we pursue the counterfactual approach, Mackie’s 
INUS approach, Woodward’s manipulationist approach, or what (to name just a few)? And what 
about the details? The corresponding debate about causal mechanism is in its comparative in-
fancy (Machamer et al. 2000; Woodward 2002). This leads to a familiar, but nevertheless uncom-
fortable tension. On the one hand, notions of causal structure and mechanism seem sufficiently 
high-level for us to ignore the details of their analysis (as Boyd effectively does). On the other 
hand, we rightly suspect this analysis to matter. Substantial differences on the basic question of 
the terms of analysis likely imply substantial differences for the analysanda. 
 We can, of course, attempt to reduce the tension by finding a middle path — “assuming as 
little as possible about the metaphysics of causation”, as Michael Strevens puts it about his 
causal-explanatory framework. Strevens notes immediately, however, that “‘As little as possible’ 
is still something, but my project is predicated on the bet that it is the nature of explanatory rele-
vance rather than the nature of causation itself that holds the key to the broad range of questions 
that I ask” (2008, 5). It is an open question whether the HPCer has this sort of substantive philo-
sophical safety net. And it is far less clear that just any old theory of causation will suit the HPC 
account’s requirements. Singularist accounts of causation, for example, seem ill-equipped to ac-
cept any account of causal structure or mechanism, if by these notions one has in mind “repeat-
ing units” of causal action. Alternatively, counterfactual or manipulation-based accounts provide 
the basic raw material for an account of causal structure, but how should they be assembled? One 
obvious suggestion would be that causal structure accrues when certain kinds of causal connec-
tions are repeated and subsequently nested. But insofar as this approach already incorporates 
some notion of kinds, it looks unsuitable to ground a general account of natural kinds.
 Of course, it’s possible that the contention about causation and causal structure will wind 
down or that productive neutrality will be achieved. But suppose that one was a causal skeptic — 
either in finding it doubtful that a univocal notion of causation would be found at the root of our 
best sciences (Norton 2003) or that we are up to the task of ferreting out causes. It doesn’t seem 
that such a stance should require giving up on natural kinds. Accepting some classification sys-
tems as contributing to our inferential and explanatory practices carries no obvious commitment 
to the existence of something that fits the description “the causal structure of the world”. Though 
Boyd formulates his accommodation thesis in metaphysically-loaded terms, he allows that em-
piricist approaches might also be possible. But he reckons that these would be approaches to 
causation. I claim that putting stability at the main level an account of a natural kind offers an 
attractive level of neutrality. For we can say an awful lot about stability without getting into 
fights about how precisely to understand it.
4.2. Homeostasis and Accommodation
As I mentioned above, essences play the role of a sort of epistemic glue for traditional natural 
kinds. Noting that some particular has properties P, Q, and R (all standard effects of having prop-
erty E — the essence of a particular kind ϕ) gives us prima facie license for inferring that the par-
ticular is of kind ϕ and thus possess the other properties S, T, U to which E gives rise. E offers us 
this license insofar as these various causal entailments are non-accidental (in some appropriately 
robust sense). E’s being the essence of  in a sense records this fact. Even when E’s identity is un-
known, treating some category as a kind (in this traditional sense) may be tantamount to accept-
ing the existence of something like Peacocke’s “condition C” — that there is some essence such 
which explains the stability of properties P, Q, R, S, T, U, &c. Possessing good reason for mak-
ing this commitment — being justified that kind  should be treated as a natural kind — is argua-
bly often part of the background knowledge we rely upon when making inferences from we 
should see it as a piece of background knowledge playing a supporting role in our inference 
(Godfrey-Smith forthcoming). 
 In HPC kinds, homeostatic mechanisms — constituted by the clustered properties themselves 
— are supposed to take over E’s epistemic role. But it is not clear that they are up to the job; not, 
at least, without a considerable degree of further specification. Consider an analogy. My guest 
room has a separate thermostat — a homeostatic mechanism par excellence. It is designed to 
maintain a consistent comfortable temperature in the room, when it is in operation. But when we 
don’t have guests, we switch it off. Many homeostatic mechanisms are like this: they operate 
only for a time, or in some but not other contexts. But the epistemic roles of kinds apparently re-
quire more stability than the mere operation of such homeostatic mechanisms provide. One 
might try to achieve this stability by adding a requirement that the mechanisms maintaining clus-
ter stability are themselves supported by further mechanisms. Change the above example a bit. 
Imagine that it’s very important that the room remain a comfortable temperature, but my thermo-
stat has a tendency of switching off after a few days of use. Being lazy but technologically ingen-
ious, I design a robot to watch the thermostat and switch it back on whenever it goes out. But 
now we must ask after the stability of the robot-watcher’s mechanism. What watches the 
watcher? The threatened regress can of course be stopped at any stage by offering a mechanism 
that guarantees the sort of stability that accommodation to our epistemic practices demands. But 
now we are elsewhere from a mere homeostatic mechanism. 
4.3. Absence, Discord, and Conventionalism
I just claimed that homeostatic mechanisms by themselves are insufficient for accommodation. I 
now claim that they are also unnecessary. Many scientifically important categories are associated 
with clusters of properties whose stability is not plausibly maintained by causal homeostatic 
mechanisms. This is quite clear for fundamental particles such as electrons or quarks which ap-
parently possess their properties (and possibly dispositions) as a matter of apparently brute 
nomic necessity. HPCers can handle such cases easily by simply restricting the scope of the HPC 
account to cover only the categories where essentialism fails. But there remain some cases ap-
parently within HPC’s purview for which it is difficult to make out the activity of causal mecha-
nisms.
 Consider sibling species. In Mayr’s famous discussion of Drosophila persimilis and pseu-
doobscura he reports that though initially thought to be physically identical, a number of differ-
ences were eventually discovered (1963, 35). His presumption, of course (as a trenchant defender 
of the biological species concept), is that the discovery of the existence of homeostatic mecha-
nisms preserving the reproductive isolation of the Drosophila species (and thus the stability of 
each species’ properties), compels their basal separation. It does not, however, compel their sepa-
ration as natural kinds: for we might very plausibly regard the whole Drosophila genus as a natu-
ral kind. Suppose we do: what is the homeostatic mechanism “holding together” the cluster of 
properties we initially identify as characteristic of that genus? Not a propensity to interbreed — 
for we have two reproductively-isolated species! Ereshefsky and Matthen suggest that the two 
separate “interbreeding structures share a common historical origin and are subject to very simi-
lar environmental pressures: this is why members of the two species are similar to each other” 
(2005, 6). Wilson et al. similarly propose that “biological individuals often are as they are and 
behave as they do because of the relations in which they stand” (2007, 198). 
 It seems a stretch, however, to regard such historical origins as homeostatic mechanisms. 
Common history and selective regimes are not obviously mechanisms at all — nor are they 
clearly homeostatic. Again, Homeostasis seems like the wrong metaphor here. What we have is 
not the resistance to disrupting a cluster of properties by the workings of certain causal connec-
tions but the stability of such clusters due to their causal isolation — the absence of potentially-
perturbing causal pathways from the here and now to the there and then. Such cases seem better 
characterized by what Griffiths calls “phylogenetic inertia” (1999, 220) — they are “frozen acci-
dents”. 
 One might object at this point that causal homeostatic mechanisms underpin phylogenetic 
inertia insofar as reproduction and development are (relatively) high-fidelity copying mecha-
nisms. This looks ad hoc. For it is uncontroversial that they are low-fidelity enough to allow for 
the variation that fuels evolution by natural selection to take place. It seems somewhat “conven-
ient” to regard reproduction and development as maintaining the coherence of a cluster of prop-
erties just when selection and drift do not disrupt the homogenizing activity of reproduction and 
development. These processes become the relevant mechanisms unless they are not. 
 Once one sees this pattern, similar cases are relatively easy to spot. I have elsewhere sug-
gested that different enantiomers of biochemical species might be considered to be distinct natu-
ral kinds (Slater 2005). But enantiomers seem like paradigm cases of kinds whose characteristic 
properties are maintained neither by a common microstructural essence nor causal mechanism. 
They are merely “stuck” in space in ways that are causally isolated and given certain types of 
chiral environments lead to the manifestation of different characteristic dispositions.
 If the above examples are unconvincing, reflect on the fact that many of the sorts of proc-
esses Boyd and other HPCers focus on can actually be engaged in pulling a kind apart. Consider 
a species taxon which plays the role of a natural kind for certain questions and pursuits. Clearly, 
we cannot count on this category always playing these roles — natural selection might disrupt 
the stability of the associated property cluster. We need to remember that in some cases the dis-
rupting influences of selection are ever-present. Individuals on the extreme ends of a trait pa-
rameter may have an evolutionary edge over their more moderate kin (see Figure 1). Such selec-
tive regimes are quite implausible as “homeostatic mechanisms”; nor need they be “heterostatic”. 
But discovering that disruptive selection is operating on a particular taxon need not besmirch its 
epistemic utility. Accordingly, it does not show us that we were wrong to treat that category as a 
natural kind. For in certain scientific contexts (such as conservation ecology, medicine, func-
tional biology) where stability across evolutionary timescales is of little concern, even species in 
“heterodynamic” selective regimes may possess a cluster of properties which are stable enough 
to afford inference and explanation in those contexts.
Figure 1: Disruptive selection in the seedcracking finch Pyrenestes ostrinus. (a) Beak size distri-
bution; (b) General body size distribution; (c) Fitness shows “twin peaks” corresponding to the 
peaks and valleys in the frequency distribution in (a). (Figure and caption from Ridley 2003, 80)
 It might be thought that as soon as we grant the workings of these heterodynamic forces 
working to pull apart clustered properties, we see right away that there must be opposing homeo-
static mechanisms (intrinsic or extrinsic) at work as well maintaining the stability of the clusters. 
The mechanisms of reproduction and development will again seem tempting candidates. But the 
fact of short-timescale stability in the face of disruptive selection needn’t imply the imperfect 
workings of  homeostatic mechanisms ultimately fighting a loosing battle. Consider diamond, 
that highly sought-after allotrope of carbon. There is a sense in which diamonds are not forever: 
the transition from diamond to graphite in standard conditions is spontaneous (∆G° = –2.9 kJ/
mol). But it occurs so slowly as to never be witnessed by human eyes. Only at higher tempera-
tures does the transition occur at an observable rate (Shriver et al. 1994, 480). Diamond is said to 
be metastable in this sense — a phenomenon also attributed to certain organic macromolecules 
like proteins, DNA, and RNA. I suggest that we can identify a sense of metastability for biologi-
cal taxa as well. Even in cases where populations are gradually diverging, the relevant property 
clusters may exhibit what we might term “biological metastability”. This may in fact be the norm 
for species and may — depending on our interests, intentions, and such — suffice to accommo-
date our inductive and explanatory practices. Mimicked stability may be, for the purposes of ac-
commodation, stability simpliciter. This idea is at the core of the account of natural kinds I 
sketch below.
 Finally, there is a more general concern about the role of causal mechanisms in the HPC ac-
count stemming from reflection on contemporary accounts of mechanism (see, e.g., Machamer et 
al. 2000; Woodward 2002). Craver (2009) has argued that the lack of objectivity about mecha-
nisms runs afoul of HPC’s accommodation thesis. In short, HPC wrongly assumes that there is 
an objective “mechanistic structure of the world”. Specifically, Craver argues that it is not always 
clear whether two phenomena are expressions of the same kind of mechanism or where one 
mechanism begins and another ends. To the extent that one ties the identity of a kind to a particu-
lar mechanism, Craver writes, “one can be led to lump or split the same putative kind in different 
ways depending on which mechanism one consults in accommodating the taxonomy to the 
mechanistic structure of the world” (583). If Craver is correct that “human perspectives and con-
ventions enter into judgments about how mechanisms should be typed and individuated” (591) 
— and I tend to think he is —, then it would appear that what natural kinds on the HPC view will 
depend on those perspectives and conventions. This leads to what many will regard as an unac-
ceptably conventionalist pluralism about what kinds there are. Such a result concerns me less 
than the fact the notion of a causal mechanism remains vague enough as to be well-nigh useless 
as a starting point for dividing the world into kinds.  
It might be objected that I am over-interpreting what is meant to be a metaphor. If that’s so, I am 
better interpreted as challenging the aptness of the metaphor. Anyway, an account of natural 
kinds ought to rest on firmer theoretical foundation than a metaphorical similarity to other known 
entities and processes (especially when they appear to already presume some conception of 
“kindness”). 
 Now, it may be possible to articulate a conception of causal homeostatic mechanisms that 
would circumvent the concerns I have articulated here. Even so, the results are likely to inherit 
other difficulties and controversies that have long dogged debates about causation and mecha-
nism. Rather than contending over these particulars, it seems prudent to focus on the intended 
effect of the existence of essences and the operation of causal homeostatic mechanisms in virtue 
of which natural kind categories contribute to our epistemic practices: that the clustering is, in a 
sense to be discussed, stable. This is the central idea of the alternative cluster account I sketch 
below.
5. Stable Property Cluster Kinds
5.1. The Basic Idea
Let us return briefly to the example of the roulette wheel. Peacocke’s demand that some condi-
tion ensure the repeated red-spinnings might be seen as a way of ensuring the stability or robust-
ness of this occurrence. The modal fragility of such an occurrence — the sense in which had 
various things gone very slightly differently with the spinning, we wouldn’t have seen fifty 
reds — seems to imply a temporal fragility that cancels our inductive warrant. This seems quite 
plausible. If some truth could easily have been false, then who’s to say that it won’t go false any 
time from now. On reflection, however, the general implication does not hold. There are lots of 
facts that are modally fragile in the sense that they very easily might not have occurred — for 
example, that Cletus the clumsy archer won the archery tournament yesterday — but which are 
not in any danger of ceasing to be true in the future. 
 Even if one rejects this modal-to-temporal implication, one might still insist that our induc-
tive and explanatory practices need to be grounded by more than just dumb luck. However this 
may be, I see little reason to focus on the various precise ways in which the stability of a cluster 
of properties obtains. What matters for the epistemic utility of kind categories is not the cause or 
explanation of their stability, but the fact that they are stable. Peter Lipton expressed a similar 
sentiment when, in commenting on Kornblith’s application of the HPC account to the problem of 
inductive knowledge, he wrote: “Essences are supposed to hold together observable properties in 
stable clusters, but it is not made clear why this should make for a more inductively knowable 
world than one where that stability is a brute fact” (1996, 493). Accordingly, the Stable Property 
Cluster (SPC) account of natural kinds identifies natural kinds (for particular sciences) as catego-
ries associated with clusters of properties (in the HPC sense) which are sufficiently stably coin-
stantiated to accommodate the inferential and explanatory to which those sciences put such cate-
gories.
 This subtle shift of focus scores three significant goals. First, the SPC account evades the 
problems mentioned above. Even categories associated with clusters of properties whose socia-
bility are gradually being disrupted by heterodynamic selection regimes can underpin our epis-
temic practices in virtue of their having sufficient stability for the purposes of the relevant sci-
ences. Ditto for categories whose cluster’s stability is not maintained by any mechanisms in par-
ticular. Second, it achieves an attractive degree of neutrality. Stability, as I shall understand it is a 
high-level concept that is independent of its particular realizers and their analysis. Third, it repre-
sents a more general account of natural kinds able to encompass strict essentialist kinds, kinds 
with historical essences (Griffiths 1999; Okasha 2002), and HPC kinds whose clusters’ stability 
are maintained by genuinely homeostatic causal mechanisms. The stability that lends itself to a 
kind’s inductive and explanatory utility is, as philosophers of science are apt to say, multiply re-
alized.
5.2. Two Conceptions of Stability
What might it mean to call a cluster of properties “stable”? One first stab might focus on the in-
stantiation of the clustered properties by a particular individual — an instance of the kind associ-
ated with that cluster. Say that a property cluster kind ϕ is instance-stable when (to a first ap-
proximation) satisfiers of ϕ (individuals of the kind ϕ) do not easily relinquish the relevant clus-
ter of properties. When instantiated, the instances of the properties in  resist their non-
instantiation — perhaps by constituting a homeostatic mechanism. 
 Instance stability is both too strong and too weak for characterizing natural kinds. It is too 
strong inasmuch as it implies that kind membership is “sticky”. Once a particular thing satisfies 
the cluster of properties associated with a kind ϕ, it resists becoming not-ϕ. But while this may 
be characteristic of some kinds (cases where kind-essence and individual-essence are somehow 
bound together), other objects apparently change their kind quite readily. Instance stability is too 
weak in that it does not sufficiently account for kinds’ epistemic role. To see this, let us consider 
a schematic example.
 Suppose that ϕ is a kind associated with a cluster of properties P, Q, R, S, T. We can use 
brackets to denote that these properties are clustered without presuming the involvement of other 
abstracta (to wit, sets): [P, Q, R, S, T]; for convenience, let us also use the name of the kind en-
closed in brackets as a notational equivalent: [ϕ]. We can think of these as predicate in the nor-
mal way — e.g., j is a member of cluster kind ϕ could be symbolized as ‘[ϕ]j’ or ‘[P, Q, R, S, T]j 
’ (depending on how specific we wished to be) — so long as we do not think of this as reducing 
to either ‘Pj ∧ Qj ∧ Rj ∧ Sj ∧ Tj’ or ‘Pj ∨ Qj ∨ Rj ∨ Sj ∨ Tj’. For on the cluster kind view, for j to 
be a member of  is not for it to have all of (or at least one of) P, Q, R, S, T. Rather, it is for j to 
have a cluster of those properties. I shall have more to say later about what constitutes a cluster; 
for the meanwhile, I leave it at the intuitive level — something along the lines of “a goodly many 
of the properties in question”.  We can represent ’s instance-stability as the claim that for all x,
[P, Q, R, S, T]x →■[P, Q, R, S, T]x
using ‘■’ as a sort of “robustness” operator, temporal or modal: the precise interpretation of this 
operator is not my present focus. But ϕ’s being an SPC kind in this sense does not do justice to 
the inference pattern mentioned in §4 above, where the observation that j has P, Q, R gives us 
good reason for expecting that j has S and T as  well. What we want out of clusters is not mere 
“sociability” — that once a cluster of properties are together instantiated, they are hard to scatter 
—, but cliquishness. Peg, Quinn, Ralph, Sarah, and Tim form a clique, say. Spotting Penny, 
Quinn, and Ralph at the mall means that Sarah and Tim are probably there as well. Nothing is 
implied about how long they’ll stay. Perhaps they flit from place to place, but when a few of 
them are around, you can bet that the others will be as well.
 Call this conception of stability cliquish stability. This is a rather more “abstract” variety of 
stability: a cluster of properties can be cliquishly-stable without its being instance-stable. The 
idea is to capture the fact that some properties are clustered such that possession of some reliably 
(if imperfectly) indicates the possession of whole cluster (if not each property in the cluster). To 
be more precise about this, we need the notion of a “sub-cluster”. Consider again our property 
cluster [ϕ] (that is, [P, Q, R, S, T]). Let a sub-cluster of [ϕ] include some but not all of the proper-
ties in [ϕ]. ‘Some’ here is meant to be interpreted not as the familiar existential quantifier of first-
order logic, but as the more familiar colloquial usage as an indefinite plural quantifier (as in 
“some philosophers got inebriated at the Smoker”). [P, R, T] would thus be a sub-cluster of [ϕ]; 
as would [Q, R], and so on. For convenience, assign arbitrary names to these sub-clusters by 
simply subscripting [ϕ]: [ϕ1], [ϕ2], [ϕ3], . . . . Now let us say that a property cluster [ϕ] is 
cliquishly-stable when for all x and for many sub-clusters [ϕ1], [ϕ2], [ϕ3],…:
■(([ϕ1]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ2]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ3]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ . . . )
where the ‘⇒’ is to be read as probabilistic entailment. And again we have the “black box” of 
robustness. What to say about this? 
 The option I’d like to explore here takes its cue from Marc Lange’s treatment of laws as 
members of a certain type of stable set. The basic idea is that certain sets of truths are maximally 
invariant under counterfactual perturbations. Given any counterfactual consistent with the mem-
bers of the set, had it been the case, then all the members of the set would still have been the 
case. Ditto for an arbitrarily nested sequence of counterfactuals: had anything at all compatible 
with the set been the case, then had anything else compatible with the set been the case, (and so 
on), then the members of the set would still have been true. Lange calls this special kind of sta-
bility “non-nomic stability” (for extensive discussion, see Lange 2000, 2009). Take some 
logically-closed set of truths Γ. This set possesses non-nomic stability if and only if for each 
member m of Γ:
p ☐→ m,
q ☐→(p ☐→ m),
r ☐→(q ☐→ (p ☐→ m)), . . . 
for any non-nomic claims p, q, r, … which are logically consistent with the members of Γ. Lange 
conjectures that the set of laws is the only non-trivially non-nomically stable set. This affords a 
sharp distinction between the facts which are laws and those which are accidents. 
 However, Lange allows that there are different sets which are stable on more restrictive 
ranges of counterfactual suppositions. That this is so is especially clear for certain biological sci-
ences. Some biological generalizations, though they clearly could have been false, possess a sig-
nificant degree of stability in the face of these more restrictive ranges counterfactual supposi-
tions. Consider an example. Lange mentions the belief among anthropologists that “any person 
of entirely Native-American heritage is blood type O or blood type A” (2000, 13). Though a his-
torical accident — “research has suggested that all Native Americans are descended from a very 
small band that crossed the Siberia-Alaska land bridge, and as it happened, allele B was not rep-
resented in that company” (ibid.) —, that accident features a broad range of counterfactual stabil-
ity. It would still be the case had a very wide array of facts been different. To modify another of 
Lange’s examples (2004, 106), doctors might report that a certain Native-American patient 
would still have gone into anaphylactic shock if the transfusion of type B blood had been admin-
istered sooner, or administered along with a different concentration of saline, or what have you. 
Of course, the blood type generalization probably wouldn’t still be true had, say, the winter of 
10,273BCE been slightly warmer — at least, we shouldn’t evince much confidence that it would. 
The point is that if you are an emergency room doctor, the blood type generalization is stable 
enough for you to rely on; for it is unlikely that you would be very interested in counterfactuals 
involving the weather twelve thousand years ago. What matters to you is what manipulations in 
the here and now might save your patient.
 Lange suggests we think of such restrictions of the range of counterfactuals under which cer-
tain generalizations are stable as being defined by the “interests” of the relevant special sciences. 
Change the above example slightly; Lange claims that
it is of medical interest to know whether a given heart attack might have been less 
serious had epinephrine been administered sooner, or had the patient long been 
engaged in a vigorous exercise regimen, or had she been wearing a red shirt, or 
had the Moon been waxing. But it is not of medical interest to know whether the 
heart attack might have been less serious had human beings evolved under some 
different selection pressure. A physician might blame a patient’s untimely death 
on her smoking, but not on human evolutionary history. (Lange 2004, 107)
While I am very much sympathetic to this basic idea — there are certainly certain counterfactual 
antecedents which are of perennial interest to certain fields and many more others which are not 
—, there are some pressing concerns about the details of how interests apportion modal space. 
Set these for the time being and focus on the applicability of the basic idea to SPC view of kinds. 
 Suppose we understand the black box in the above definition of cliquish stability in a broadly 
Langian way: that a property cluster [ϕ] is cliquishly-stable when for all x and for many sub-
clusters [ϕ1], [ϕ2], [ϕ3], . . . .:
p ☐→ (([ϕ1]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ2]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ3]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ . . . ),
q ☐→(p ☐→ (([ϕ1]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ2]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ3]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ . . . ),
r ☐→(q ☐→ (p ☐→ (([ϕ1]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ2]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ ([ϕ3]x ⇒ [ϕ]x) ∧ . . . ), . . . 
where p, q, r, . . . meet the following conditions:
(a) They are consistent with the probabilistic entailment relationships from 
sub-clusters to clusters;
(b) They are consistent with the natural laws (i.e., no counterlegals);
(c) They meet the relevant applicability standards.
The justification of conditions (a) and (b) is fairly straightforward: (a) is isomorphic to Lange’s 
requirements for p, q, r, . . . in his definition of non-nomic stability. We cannot expect some fact 
to be stable on the assumption of its negation: this would be tantamount in this case to insisting 
that something remain a natural kind even if it failed to be a natural kind! The justification of (b) 
is likewise parasitic on Lange’s construction and assumes that the laws are at least partly respon-
sible for facts about the relationships among a cluster’s properties. Actually, (b) is stronger than 
we really need, since there will be some counterlegals on which certain cluster relationships con-
tinue to hold. But this overkill affords some simplicity and does no harm that I can see. 
 Condition (c) is the interesting — because open-ended — condition. Here we apparently re-
turn to the worries about Lange’s invocation of the interests of certain special sciences. One 
worry is that if interests play a significant role in the definition of stability, then we immediately 
foreclose on the “naturalness” of a system of natural kinds defined in these terms. 
 Another pressing question I already gestured toward: What exactly defines a discipline’s in-
terests? Is it credible that disciplines implicitly single out certain ranges of counterfactual ante-
cedents for consideration of whether certain other facts would remain true on their supposition? 
(I take it for granted that they do not explicitly do so.) Prima facie, it seems far easier to make 
sense of certain counterfactual antecedents not being of interest to a particular discipline. Were 
you to ask one of the doctors whether she was interested in whether the heart attack would still 
have been as severe if the humans had followed a different evolutionary trajectory, the answer 
surely would be “no”. But asking the doctor whether she is interested in what the scenario would 
have been like under different fashion or lunar conditions doesn’t seem likely to elicit a different 
response. One might claim that the reason our doctor won’t capitulate to being interested in the 
phase of the moon is that she already knows (or judges with a high confidence) that the moon’s 
phase has (practically) nothing to do with her patient’s heart condition. Perhaps this is enough to 
qualify the moon’s phase as of medical interest. This strikes me as a rather odd thing to say — 
but perhaps only for Gricean reasons.
 I prefer to think of condition (c) above as being defined in terms of “relevance” rather than 
interests. Interests do play a role in determining which counterfactuals are relevant to the evalua-
tion of cliquish stability, but only in a derivative way. To illustrate, consider an example. Medi-
cine is interested in saving lives, let’s say. The inferential and explanatory work of the medical 
sciences focuses on this goal by considering circumstances that are within our power to control: 
hence the relevance to medical practice of the counterfactual suppositions involving different 
amounts of drugs, exercise, or time in the ambulance; and hence the irrelevance of suppositions 
involving evolutionary contingencies or circumstances likely to bear on them. It is not simply 
that such “frozen accidents” are without our power to change — for nor is it within our power to 
change how long a certain patient spent in an ambulance once they are at the hospital. Rather, the 
accidents of evolutionary history are not similar in informative ways to circumstances which are 
manipulable. In contrast, reflecting on whether a certain patient would have lived had he arrived 
at the hospital sooner, is potentially instructive for future cases. This is why shirt color and lunar 
phase are also relevant (in the present sense) to medical concerns. They are circumstances which 
are similar to those we can either manipulate (shirt color) or at least be sensitive to (lunar phase). 
 Property clusters which are cliquishly-stable for a given science, project, research program, 
or what have you thus offer certain fixed points for those inquiries in the sense that for possible 
manipulations relevant to those pursuits we may count on finding the clustered properties to-
gether, where we find them. This raises the possibility that some clusters are only natural kinds 
for particular domains of inquiry. The result is straightforwardly parallel to Lange’s treatment of 
special science laws, but not uncontroversial for this reason. In particular, one might worry that 
this would squash any hope of the SPC account offering a sense in which kinds “carve nature at 
its joints”.
6. Interests and Realism about SPC Kinds
SPC kinds can be, as I will put it, “domain-relative” in several senses. First, there is the question 
of how many properties are expected to be clustered together for something to count as a kind. 
Second, the norms and aims of certain domains may require different levels of cluster cohesive-
ness — that is, different disciplines may tolerate different degrees of flexibility in the clustering 
required by their respective kinds. Perhaps property clusters defining physical kinds like elec-
trons or quarks are supposed by those disciplines to be perfectly clustered (conjunctive) kinds 
while those of higher biological taxa like families may be quite loose. A third, closely related, 
sense in which cluster kinds can be domain-relative is in how the probabilistic entailment rela-
tions are understood: how likely is it that the instantiation of a certain sub-cluster betokens the 
instantiation of the whole cluster? Fourth, and finally, we have the interest-informed relevance 
condition (c) above circumscribing how we think of a cluster’s stability. Inasmuch as a particular 
cluster of properties can meet the requisite conditions for one domain but fail to meet them in 
another, we must allow that at least some collections of things only instantiate natural kinds from 
the perspective of particular sciences, or to pick a more neutral term: domains. Call this domain-
relativity. If some kinds are domain-relative, the question of what kinds there are tout court is not 
tractable. What we can legitimately ask instead is what kinds various domains of inquiry in fact 
recognize or would recognize given their present aims and interests. 
 A different relativity about natural kinds may attach to certain physical contexts: call this 
context-relativity. The point can be easily made using the language of homeostatic mechanisms, 
but applies mutatis mutandis to SPC kinds. If certain mechanisms only successfully maintain the 
stability of a cluster in particular contexts, then such clusters fail to be natural kinds unless rela-
tivized to those contexts. Of course, contexts where the properties in the cluster typically go un-
instantiated anyway will not generate this effect. Remember: we are not talking about instance 
stability. Many instances of a kind lose their properties in some circumstances (e.g., a protein 
denatures outside of its usual temperature range). The context-sensitivity at issue here is a more 
subtle affair: where the property cluster may continue to be instantiated, though the mecha-
nism(s) maintaining its stability no longer function. For example, the cluster of properties defin-
ing certain cell types may only be stable when considered in vivo (rather than in a Petri dish, 
say).
 In allowing the interests and norms of a discipline — or even a particular research project — 
to influence whether a certain category counts as a natural kind might seem like a rather hefty 
dose of pragmatism to swallow. No doubt some will be happy about this. Others may see it as a 
bridge too far: a theory of natural kinds, they will insist, should tell us about the objective divi-
sions in the world that pre-exist our classificatory activities. Otherwise, we cannot make sense of 
some theories doing better than others at “carving nature” nor how certain schemes of classifica-
tion can be in error. 
 This concern is overstated. Though there’s a clear sense in which we cannot be mistaken 
about what norms and interests to adopt concerning certain classifications (since norms are not 
truth-apt), I think we can come to see ourselves as having been wrong to hold those norms. Per-
haps we held them in the first place due to some genuine mistake (taking some homogenizing 
effect as more important than it actually is, say). And we certainly can be mistaken about 
whether a certain category is associated with properties that stably cluster given the relevant 
norms and interests (assuming that there are facts about property instantiations and what sub-
junctive claims which are true independently of us). Moreover, it seems plausible that there 
might be other ways of evaluating our norms. We may, for example, find that failing to relativize 
the evaluation of a certain cluster’s stability forecloses on certain inferential advantages flowing 
from recognizing a category as a context-relative kind. This, of course, presumes other “meta-
norms” — such as: whenever possible, we ought to revise our norms governing property cluster 
stability evaluation so as to increase our recognition of kinds.
 So while a domain’s norms and interests are relevant to what natural kinds there are, it’s not 
the case that we can arbitrarily “define nature’s joints into existence”. Nor do natural kinds await 
our classificatory activity in order to come into being. For the norms and interests relevant to a 
cluster’s stability often pre-exist those activities. They do not, however, pre-exist us. Thus a critic 
might point out that there is no live sense in which the SPC account is a realist account of natural 
kinds — for it seems that there is no sense in which there were SPC kinds before science came 
on the scene a few thousand (or a few hundred) years ago. But surely there were different natural 
kinds of things!
 I think that there are two compelling things to say in response. First, it is not clear to me that 
we should be aiming for a realist conception of natural kinds to begin with. I put a higher priority 
on maintaining some of the key realist intuitions about classification — that we can be mistaken 
about our systems of classification, that we can classify things in better and worse ways, and so 
on. Second, one may hold out for a sense in which certain special categories — electrons, say — 
are natural kinds in a norm-neutral way. I think I can assent to the spirit of such a request, if not 
the letter, with minimal retraction of what I’ve been pressing by (so to say) crossing Mill with 
Whewell. Recall Whewell’s (1840) much cited idea about the naturalness of a system of classifi-
cation stemming from the convergence of different systems of classification on the same catego-
ries. Though neat, this idea won’t help us make sense of electrons having discipline-independent 
objectivity, since the non-physical sciences (for the most part) do not have a great deal of truck 
with fundamental particles. Here, however, we might invoke another nifty idea from John Stuart 
Mill (1872) about objects as “permanent possibilities of sensation”. Perhaps there are some clus-
ters of properties such that no matter how a discipline adjusted its norms and aims (compatible 
with the discipline maintaining an understanding of the natural world in view), the category that 
cluster described would be fit to play a robust epistemic role in the discipline. We might say that 
such categories exhibit a “permanent possibility of Whewellian convergence”. This allows us to 
see that the pluralism resulting from the SPC account’s domain- and context-relativity need not 
extend to all kinds. [I’m very unconfident about this idea: perhaps I should drop it as or-
thogonal to the rest?]
 While this goes some ways toward accommodating realist intuitions, I readily admit that the 
SPC account exhibits some distinctively non-realist features. The context- and discipline-
relativity of some kinds show that natural kinds (on the SPC view) are not an ontological cate-
gory (cf. Lowe 2006). Nor is it obvious how they could be reducible to facts in other ontological 
categories — universals, for instance. Bird suggests that:
a simple reduction of kinds to combinations of universals is available along the 
lines proposed by Armstrong. . . . [This] strategy can be extended, by considering 
kinds as homeostatic property clusters. Although Boyd does not see that latter in 
ontological terms, we can construe them as sums of properties, just as complex 
particulars are the sums of their component parts. (Bird forthcoming, 11)
Yet treating a cluster of properties as a conjunction trades away what is arguably most distinctive 
about the approach: its looseness and corresponding ability to accommodate the messy patterns 
of biological variation and similarity. The conjunctive approach is far too strong. 
 Richards makes essentially the opposite mistake by understanding property cluster accounts 
of kinds as disjunctions of properties: “essences [on the HPC view] are a disjunction” (2010, 
154). This approach is inappropriately weak. Suppose we take a kind K as being defined as being 
P ∨ Q ∨ R. Two individuals could possess this disjunctive property while sharing neither P nor Q 
nor R in common. Disjunctive similarity is dirt cheap. The cluster approach requires more. What, 
then, are SPC kinds if not conjunctions of universals? Rather than recognize a sui generis cate-
gory — of clusters, say —, I prefer to think of being a natural kind as a kind of status things or 
pluralities of things in various ontological categories can have. As we shall see in the next and 
final section, this approach offers what seems to me some welcome respite from a longstanding 
debate about the metaphysics of species.
7. Case Study: Species
[This section is very much “in progress” and will be developed further — with specific ex-
amples and philosophical issues indicated below.]
It’s time to see the SPC account at work. Since species have already featured prominently as a 
test case for the HPC account of species [references], I will concentrate my discussion on some 
of the novelties. We’ve already seen reason for thinking that concern over the details of causal 
mechanisms are likely to affect the application of the HPC view to species. Obviously the SPC 
account avoids those difficulties. But prima facie, it inherits other difficulties detractors have 
raised for the HPC account. In this section, I shall focus on on in particular stemming from the 
fact that many species are highly polytypic that has been developed most explicitly by Ereshef-
sky and Matthen (2005). 
 While HPCers have things to say in response, it seems to me that they underestimate the 
force of the problem (indeed, it strikes me that Ereshefsky and Matthen do not fully appreciate 
its import). I propose a “bent solution” that flows from the anti-metaphysical stance taken above. 
Because SPC kinds are not properly speaking an ontological category, there is no pressure to at-
tempt a univocal application of the SPC account to species. While many species taxa are argua-
bly SPC kinds, I believe that we ought to admit that some are not (or are “less so”). This coheres, 
I think, with our epistemic treatment of these taxa. 
7.1. The Challenge of Species Polymorphism
“The Buckets” 
Ereshefsky and Matthen claim that HPCers like Boyd (1991, 1999) and Millikan (1999) “mis-
identify the phenomenon” which the HPC theory attempts to solve.
They think that natural kinds, including biological taxa, are united by similarity 
within the species-population, and this is what needs to be explained by homeo-
static mechanisms. And it is undeniably true that there is similarity within bio-
logical taxa. Nevertheless, it is equally true that many taxa are characterized by 
stable and persistent differences. (2005, 7)
Familiar examples — of sexual dimorphism or differences in developmental stage — show that 
if species are natural kinds, natural kinds are not united exclusively by similarity relations. Hence 
as soon as one starts to seriously consider the prospect of characterizing species — even roughly, 
imperfectly — by reference to a cluster of shared properties, one encounters a biological ac-
counting nightmare. Far from homeostatic mechanisms maintaining the similarity of members of 
a species, there may be mechanisms preserving a population’s polymorphism: what Ereshefsky 
and Matthen refer to as “heterostatic mechanisms” (14). 
 Two knee-jerk responses to this problem should be set aside (one more gently than the other): 
on the one hand, as we’ve noted, polytypism drives many to “deep” structural properties (like 
genetic essences) that even members of different sexes or morphs necessarily share. This 
wrongly assumes that there are (and will always be) suitably deep properties to do the job. Fail-
ing this, biologists may go historical: phenetic character (either at the macro or micro level) 
doesn’t matter nearly as much as descent. While this latter option has more going for it, it seems 
not the only solution. Do not HPCers have a way out? 
 Boyd recognizes the challenge posed by polytypic species, but sees it as requiring only 
elaboration of the HPC account. We may have to 
characterize the homeostatic property cluster associated with a biological species 
as containing lots of conditionally specified disposition properties for which ca-
nonical descriptions might be something like, “if male and in the first mold, P,” or 
“if female and in the aquatic stage, Q” (1999, 165). 
Matthen and Ereshefsky worry that this sort of maneuver will “become a universal solvent that 
makes all variation disappear and collapses the entire biological domain into a single morpho-
clump”, thus trivializing natural kinds. “One could then regard the vast network of ecological 
relationships that constitute the biosphere as a single homeostatic property cluster maintaining 
polymorphism in ‘Gaia’” (2005, 9). This seems an overreaction (Wilson et al. 2007, 210–211). 
That we can identify terrestrial life as of a kind does not imply that we ought to (ignoring nested 
kinds in the process). Whether HPCers are right to be nonplussed by the status of Ereshefsky and 
Matthen’s concern, there are some deeper problems with the conditional response to the poly-
morphism problem.
 First, while many kinds of polymorphism occur in connection to independently-specifiable 
physiological conditions (e.g., sex or developmental stage), it is by no means clear that all poly-
morphism can be. In some species, adults of each gender exhibit striking polymorphism [refs]; in 
others, different environmental contexts trigger the disparity. Just take the most familiar poly-
typic species: dogs. What conditional size specification might we attach to Great Danes and Chi-
huahuas? Employing those names (as in ‘If Great Dane, then …’) looks like it would incur a 
heavy dose of circularity.
 More importantly, a second problem concerns how we should interpret these conditional 
properties. It’s difficult to tell what Boyd’s intentions are from what he writes. While he men-
tions dispositional properties, he speaks of conditionals — many doubt that these are equivalent. 
Set that worry aside for the moment. Those who think that dispositional properties are reducible 
to conditionals, typically finger subjunctive conditionals for this task; yet Boyd’s examples ap-
pear to be indicative conditionals. There are difficulties with either interpretation.
 Suppose we elect the latter interpretation. Consider a certain species S which features a tidy 
sexual dimorphism. Members of S (typically) share the complex logical property ‘being an x, 
such that (if Mx, then Px) and (if Fx, then Qx)’, where M and F stand for the sexes and P and Q, 
other biological properties not shared between males and females. This logical property is con-
junctive in character. Accordingly, it can be decompose into two components which are condi-
tional in character. So far so good. But conditionals are equivalent to disjunctions. So our ini-
tially unproblematic-looking logical property boils down to a pair of disjunctive properties: ‘ei-
ther not being male or being P’ and ‘either not being female or being Q’. And as we noted earlier, 
there are compelling reasons for thinking that disjunctive properties do not count at all toward 
similarity. 
 The subjunctive reading of the relevant property avoids this difficulty, but also raises awk-
ward questions. Take a particular male of S; is it the case that if it was female, it would be Q? 
That’s not clear. As P.D. Magnus (MS, 5) points out, performing a sex-change operation on a 
duck won’t generally change its plumage. Moreover, there’s something suspicious about attribut-
ing to something a subjunctive property grounded in the nature of other things. If I were a Tea-
Party Republican, I would be against universal healthcare. What makes that statement true is not 
a fact about me, but a fact about Tea-Party Republicans. One might fairly doubt the aptness of 
this analogy. Perhaps there’s some sense in which the conditional properties of polytypic species 
are imminent in them — say, in their genetic code. But notice how perilously close this move 
gets us to a genetic form of essentialism. The property in question is no longer a conditional 
property spelled-out in general terms, but something resembling a genetic essence. This appears 
to amount to a dilemma. Insisting that the subjunctive conditional properties are grounded in the 
intrinsic nature of individual members of S runs afoul of anti-essentialism; not insisting on this 
incurs the suspicion that just about anything could possess that property. If my dog Mabelle was 
a Tea-Party Republican, she too would reject universal healthcare! Ereshefsky and Matthen’s 
“universal solvent” problem returns with a vengeance.
 Return to the suggestion that members of polytypic species share dispositional properties. 
Insofar as this approach inherits the difficulties of mentioned immediately above, it doesn’t ap-
pear to be much help. Nor does treating dispositions as irreducible “powers” (Molnar 2003) look 
any more promising. Dispositions are typically understood as properties associated with a par-
ticular kind of manifestation event (e.g., shattering) triggered by certain sorts of stimuli (e.g., 
striking sharply). Whether or not these properties are analyzable or reducible to these terms, it 
doesn’t seem that “polymorphic properties” have this character. Certain species of ducks are dis-
posed to feed at the beginning and end of the day and to take flight when alarmed. It seems odd 
to say that they are disposed to have green heads when male. And in any case, the worry above 
about the apparently extrinsic ground of such facts appears to infect treating them as dispositions 
(see Magnus MS, 4–5 for discussion).
7.2. Are Species Real?
We have seen so far that straightforward responses to the polymorphism problem for cluster ac-
counts of species face some difficulties. My strategy will be to evade polymorphism problem, 
rather than face it head on. One of it crucial assumptions — which I am happy to abandon — is 
that highly polytypic taxa must be treated as natural kinds by the HPC (or some other) account of 
natural kinds. Denying this effectively exempts kind-advocates from having to account for the 
polymorphism within those taxa. This move parallels the dialectic concerning the ontology of 
species thirty years ago: when advocates of essentialistic accounts of natural kinds finally faced 
up to the heterogeneity of species at the genetic level, it did not trouble essentialism about natu-
ral kinds — just the thesis that species were natural kinds. This, of course, was one of the key 
stimuli of the rise of the species-as-individuals thesis. 
 There is an obvious objection to this line of thought: There is an important disanalogy be-
tween the historical case and the present one. In the historical case, the denial that species were 
natural kinds was part and parcel to a univocal approach to their ontology. Denying just that 
polytypic taxa are natural kinds looks comparatively ad hoc. Further, it seems to relinquish one 
of the key motivations for treating species as natural kinds: to make sense of the intuitions that 
they are (in some sense) real features of the world. Some species taxa are polytypic. If we allow 
that such taxa are not natural kinds, avoiding the polymorphism problem comes at the price of 
denying that species are natural kinds. 
 There is an ambiguity in this analysis, however. What is it for someone to claim that species 
are natural kinds — or real, for that matter? One interpretation involves a claim about the onto-
logical category of all species taxa as part of a top-down claim about the species category — that 
any taxa at the species rank must have such and such a metaphysical character. On this interpre-
tation, it makes perfect sense to ask (after Ruse 1987) “Are species natural kinds, individuals, or 
what?” and expect a univocal answer. A second, weaker interpretation treats the question as fo-
cussed on species taxa without the presumption of univocality. Asking whether species are natu-
ral kinds, on this interpretation, is tantamount to asking whether some species are natural kinds. 
 The most compelling reason I can see for preferring the first interpretation over the second 
stems from treating the issue as metaphysically-meaty question about what ontological category 
species taxa should fit into. Since I deny that SPC kinds are an ontological category, I tend to 
prefer the weaker interpretation of the question on which some but not all species taxa might 
count as natural kinds. This might seem disappointing at first (reality often is!), but I see it as 
simply reflecting the fact that not everything we identify as a species taxon in fact play the epis-
temic roles I believe are characteristic of natural kinds. But it should hardly be surprising, given 
the diverse justifications for treating certain populations of organisms as natural kinds (not all of 
which focus on their epistemic utility). It is for this sort of reason that I am deeply skeptical of 
claims like Devitt’s “that Linnaean taxa have essences that are, at least partly, intrinsic underly-
ing properties” (2008, 346). Whatever one thinks of essentialism about natural kinds in general, 
if this is taken to mean that all Linnaean taxa have such essences, it makes us too good at dis-
cerning such taxa. Compare: suppose that, incredibly, biologists discover that in fact “Bigfoot” is 
real — that is, there is a very reclusive upright primate species striding through isolated woods in 
North America. Clearly this is compatible with many of Bigfoot “sightings” being the product of 
confusion, mistake, wishful thinking, or deliberate hoax. Likewise, I believe that we can be right 
to say that species are real in virtue of there being many species taxa which are SPC natural 
kinds.
 I cannot offer a full explication of the connection between being an SPC kind and being 
“real” in this context — other than to concur with much of what Boyd has to say (mutatis mutan-
dis) about HPC kinds being real to the extent that they are fit to serve a key role in our epistemic 
practices (1991, 139). Hopefully it seems clear enough that playing such a role is at the bottom 
of many of the strongest intuitions for thinking that (many) species taxa are real in the first place. 
Whether such intuitions can be fully vindicated is a difficult question. I think we should be pre-
pared to settle for somewhat less.
 So the following sort of “dappled” picture of species taxa emerges. Some collections of or-
ganisms share a robust cluster of properties in common which, in virtue of that cluster possessing 
cliquish stability, are apt to serve in characteristic inferential and explanatory roles in particular 
disciplines and contexts. In some cases (and perhaps for some contexts and purposes), the poly-
morphism is swamped by the cluster similarity which ignores the strongly varying parameters. In 
other cases, the polymorphism is deep enough to trouble our inferences at the species level. We 
simply would not infer to ethological conclusions (say, about breeding behavior) from the fact 
that a particular organism was a mallard. We would, probably, make such inferences from the 
knowledge that that organism was a male mallard. It might happen that populations of particular 
sexes, developmental stages, subspecies, ecotypes, and so on within a species count as SPC natu-
ral kinds but that the whole species does not (or does only to an inferentially weak extent). Such 
species might be viewed as genealogically-defined assemblages of natural kinds. I take this sug-
gestion as analogous to Sterelny and Maclauren’s view of species as “ecological mosaics”: “en-
sembles of populations, each with its own niche” (2008, 38; see also Sterelny 1999). [Need to 
explore an example here in more detail, I think.]
What the SPC account of natural kinds offers us is a flexible, high-level approach to understand-
ing the various ways in which different categories can be regarded as genuine features of the 
world. Clearly many questions about the approach remain. I will close by mentioning two that 
stand out as especially urgent. First, how in detail should the intuitions that SPC kinds are 
“genuine”/“real” features of the world be squared with the various sorts of relativity I mentioned 
above? Second, how should we understand the metaphysics (and epistemology) of cliquish sta-
bility (even within a particular context)? By taking a page out of Lange’s book, should we also 
follow him to primitivism about subjunctives or propose some different account of what makes 
subjunctives true? I would prefer to not take a stance about this difficult question, elevating the 
concept of cliquish stability to a high-enough theoretical level to avoid the fray below (in some-
thing like the manner of Lange 2005), but doing so may be unavoidable. In any case, these are 
matters for another occasion.
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